On Teaching Criminal Law from a Trial Perspective by Méndez, Miguel A.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 48 




On Teaching Criminal Law from a Trial Perspective 
Miguel A. Méndez 
Stanford Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Miguel A. Méndez, On Teaching Criminal Law from a Trial Perspective, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. (2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol48/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1181 
ON TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW FROM A TRIAL PERSPECTIVE 
MIGUEL A. MÉNDEZ* 
I.  AN ERA OF INNOVATION IN TEACHING METHODS 
In the late 1970s, under the direction of Professor Paul Brest, a number of 
Stanford Law School faculty began to discuss the use of innovative methods to 
teach first-year courses.  The impetus was a very successful effort by the law 
school to enrich the second- and third-year curriculum with “clinical” courses.  
These courses did not resemble the kinds of courses associated with today’s 
clinics.  Their purpose was not to teach students by having them handle aspects 
of cases accepted by law school sponsored or affiliated clinics.  Rather, the 
goal was to teach advanced substantive law courses through exercises that 
simulated the conditions practitioners encountered in a particular field.  The 
assumption was that students could best master and critique a field of law 
when they were required to put theory into practice. 
The first of these “clinical” courses was Advanced Criminal Law, taught 
by Professor Anthony Amsterdam with the help of a psychiatrist.  Students 
taking this course were expected to conduct a full direct and cross-examination 
of mental health experts testifying in hearings involving mentally disordered 
defendants raising diminished capacity and insanity claims.  Another was 
Advanced Criminal Procedure, a course that I designed.  Students played the 
role of prosecutors or defense counsel in a criminal proceeding, from 
arraignment through trial, including a hearing on a suppression motion.  As in 
the case of Professor Amsterdam’s course, use was made of forensic experts 
and police officers, and much of the course was devoted to the direct and 
cross-examination of experts.  Members of the Palo Alto community served as 
jurors. 
By the early 1980s, the number of “clinical” courses had expanded and 
included Advanced Real Estate Transactions, Injunctions, Freedom of 
Information, Expert Testimony, Complex Litigation, and Advanced Evidence.  
Juvenile Law, taught by Professor Mike Wald, was one of the earliest of the 
clinical courses and had both simulated and live client components.  Students 
who successfully completed the simulated part were allowed to represent 
clients in the local juvenile court under the supervision of a faculty member. 
 
* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford University. 
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The clinical courses proved to be enormously popular.  To assure 
participation by the maximum number of students, the clinical faculty devised 
its own application process.  Students admitted to one course were dropped to 
the bottom of a waiting list when applying for a second course.  By the early 
1980s, about one-third of the upper-division students could be offered an 
opportunity to take one clinical course. 
In part, the clinical courses were popular because they contrasted sharply 
with the teaching methods employed in the traditional classes.  In the late 
1970s, Stanford’s faculty still adhered to the Socratic method as the principal 
mode of teaching and assessing doctrine.  In contrast, the tasks the students 
were asked to perform in the clinical courses required the students to go 
beyond case analysis and engage in systematic problem-solving in concrete 
situations similar to those encountered by practitioners in diverse fields.  
Because the settings for the clinical exercises were adversarial, students 
learned that much of what transpired in their cases depended on their initiative 
as lawyers.  Particularly in clinical courses emphasizing evidentiary hearings, 
students learned that it would be up to them to decide which witnesses to call, 
the order in which to call them, and the content and order of the questions 
asked. 
Much class time was devoted by the clinical instructors and class members 
to assessing the performance of the students doing the exercises.  Camcorders, 
thought of at the time as a kind of movie camera, were just coming into use 
and provided an almost “instant replay” means to review and critique what 
students did right and wrong.  Students who were not doing the exercise were 
required to lead the critique of a particular exercise, such as the direct 
examination of an expert.  Forms were developed by some instructors to guide 
the students in providing a useful assessment. 
In my twenty-seven years at Stanford, no period can compare with the late 
1970s and early 1980s as a time when interest in experimenting with new 
teaching methods was paramount.  Stanford was a recognized leader in 
pioneering the use of simulations in teaching advanced substantive courses.  
Although there was significant cooperation among the faculty teaching the 
clinical courses, neither the administration, the students, nor the professors 
viewed the courses as a distinct concentration.  What was taught in a given 
year depended on the interest and availability of regular faculty, visitors, and 
the effectiveness of students lobbying for a particular course. 
The dependence on the faculty’s willingness to teach a clinical course 
proved to be a major weakness.  The departure in the early 1980s of a number 
of instructors devoted to clinical teaching significantly reduced the number of 
clinical courses taught by tenure-line faculty members on a regular basis.  The 
amount of time required to teach in the simulated mode further reduced the 
number of clinical courses.  Those of us involved in clinical teaching soon 
discovered that it simply was not possible to teach in this mode and have the 
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time necessary to devote to scholarly endeavors.  Stanford, in hiring and 
promoting faculty, did not distinguish between professors using traditional 
teaching methods and those employing clinical approaches, and therefore, 
many instructors gave up their clinical courses to free up time for their 
scholarly projects.  Still, the success of the clinical courses had two immediate 
effects.  First, it encouraged other professors to use some clinical methods, 
such as problem-solving and simulations, in their courses.  Equally important, 
the success of the courses led Paul Brest, who had played a key role in 
founding the clinical courses, to convene a group of professors to explore new 
methods for teaching the first-year courses.  The result was the “B 
Curriculum,” an alternative to the traditional first-year curriculum at Stanford. 
II.  THE B CURRICULUM 
The B Curriculum, which went into effect in the fall of 1979, was not 
designed to replace the courses taught in the traditional first-year curriculum, 
which now became known as the A Curriculum.  Rather, a principal goal of the 
B Curriculum was to integrate the core first-year courses more fully and “to 
supplement these courses with shorter ones that provide[d] perspectives on the 
law from the social sciences, humanities and philosophy, as well as [an] 
economic and historical analysis of the law.”1  Another goal was to introduce 
first-year students to clinical instruction.2  Civil Procedure was selected for 
clinical treatment because of the belief that abstract procedural rules could best 
be grasped by students required to use those rules in drafting exercises and 
performing other tasks requiring “basic lawyering skills.”3 
The integration of the core first-year courses took the form of extensive 
coordination among the instructors teaching Torts, Contracts, and Statutory 
Analysis.4  Although the degree of coordination diminished over time, this goal 
was mostly achieved.5  Within two years, however, the mini-courses exposing 
the students to legal history, jurisprudence, economics, and social science 
methodology had disappeared.6  First-year students, anxious about whether 
they were mastering the doctrine in the core courses, found these courses too 
disruptive at this stage of their legal education. 
The Civil Procedure course, however, proved to be highly successful.  
Eventually, it evolved into a separate course, Lawyering Process, that focused 
on interviewing and counseling clients, negotiating and mediating disputes, 
 
 1. And Now for Something Academically Different . . . , 15 STAN. LAW., Winter/Spring 
1979–1980, at 46, 46. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Paul Brest, A First Year Course in the “Lawyering Process,” 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344, 
349 (1982). 
 5. See id. at 350. 
 6. Id. 
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drafting documents, and examining issues of professional responsibility.7  Over 
time, Lawyering Process mutated into several courses, some emphasizing the 
skills needed to represent subordinated groups and others concerned with the 
skills needed in a litigation setting. 
An issue that perplexed the group planning the new curriculum from the 
beginning was what to do with the first-year course on Criminal Law.  Tying 
the course to Torts by examining the legal response to injury was discarded as 
unworkable.  My proposal to teach Criminal Law in its procedural context was 
accepted, and I have been teaching the course from that perspective since 
1981, even though the B Curriculum was eventually abandoned in 1987. 
III.  B CURRICULUM CRIMINAL LAW 
A. The Procedural Part 
I begin with a confession: I resisted the invitation to teach Criminal Law.  
Before joining the Stanford faculty, I had served as a public defender, and in 
that capacity, had represented hundreds of clients at arraignments, preliminary 
hearings, motions to suppress evidence, and trials on misdemeanor and felony 
charges.  Not once had an issue involving the substantive criminal law arisen 
in any of my cases or those of my fellow public defenders.  What mattered 
most to a successful criminal practice was knowing how to investigate a case, 
suppress unfavorable evidence, and persuade jurors to return defense verdicts.  
Pretrial practice required a knowledge of criminal procedure, not criminal law.  
Moreover, knowledge of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, 
while necessary, was insufficient to a successful motion practice.  Mastery of 
the rules of evidence and principles of trial advocacy mattered just as much in 
trials and preliminary hearings.8  Still, the desire to examine the doctrinal and 
normative aspects of criminal law from a different perspective convinced me 
that I should attempt to teach the subject from a “procedural” perspective. 
Fortunately, Professor Phil Johnson of Boalt Hall had just published the 
second edition of a casebook that examined criminal law from that 
perspective.9  I adopted his book and have used it ever since, even though the 
procedural materials have been reduced substantially.  Originally, about one-
third of the book was devoted to exploring the role of counsel and the judge at 
 
 7. Id. at 344. 
 8. At the time I was a defense lawyer, the rules of evidence applied to California 
preliminary hearings.  Today, hearsay can be received at preliminary hearings under some 
circumstances and limits have been imposed on the right of the defense to call and examine 
witnesses at preliminary hearings.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1203.1 (West 1995). 
 9. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW IN ITS PROCEDURAL CONTEXT (2d ed. 1980). 
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arraignments, preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings, trials, and 
sentencings.  In later editions, most of these topics were condensed into a 
single chapter,10 but the book still serves my goal of enabling the students to 
examine criminal law from a procedural, and especially, a trial perspective.  
But to achieve this goal, I now have my own supplement, which includes a 
description of how a criminal case is processed in California and, because of 
the centrality of the trial, a discussion of the stages of a trial.  In addition, the 
supplement describes the dynamics that attend an adversarial proceeding and 
introduces the students to basic principles of trial advocacy. 
One of my main goals is to help the students appreciate that it is the 
lawyers (and not, as they suppose, the judges) who play the principal role in 
how an American trial unfolds.  Prosecutors decide who and what to charge, 
defense counsel decide whether to bring suppression and other defensive 
motions, and it is the lawyers who determine what will take place at each stage 
of a trial, from deciding which witnesses will be called to the questions that 
will be asked on direct and cross-examination.  The importance of party 
initiative is driven home when the students realize that, as a general rule, the 
failure to object means that the erroneous receipt of evidence or improper 
argument can not be raised on appeal by the accused. 
The importance of the role of the defense lawyer becomes apparent when 
we reach our first case, Gideon v. Wainwright.11  I begin by asking one of the 
students to assume the role of Gideon at the trial.  The remaining students are 
to play the role of the judge and rule on objections.  I then make the 
prosecution’s opening statement in which I include much inadmissible but 
damning matter.  If “Gideon” fails to object to the opening statement or fails to 
come up with a specific objection, I then play the role of the judge and ask 
“Gideon” whether he wishes to make an opening statement or “reserve.”  By 
that time, the point is amply made.  A defendant untrained in the law simply 
has no chance against a seasoned prosecutor, even if the defendant is innocent. 
Gideon includes a quotation from Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Powell v. 
Alabama12 in which he notes that without the helping hand of counsel, “though 
he be not guilty, [the accused] faces the danger of conviction because he does 
not know how to establish his innocence.”13  This insight flies in the teeth of 
accepted doctrine, such as the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  But because by now Justice 
Sutherland’s observation seems “right” to the students, they must cope with a 
 
 10. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND TEXT 509-613 (7th ed. 2002). 
 11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 12. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 13. Id. at 69. 
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troubling conflict between theory and practice.  Justice Sutherland, I point out 
to the students, was a trial lawyer before accepting appointment to the bench. 
I next have the students examine the role of defense counsel on appeal.  To 
some, it is not apparent why the Supreme Court held in Douglas v. California14 
that an indigent is entitled to appointed counsel on appeals granted as a matter 
of right.  After all, the trial courtroom has been left behind, and the issues on 
appeal simply call for the kind of legal analysis learned in law school.  But 
perceptions change when I hand a student an imaginary transcript and ask the 
student to identify those errors that the student believes are most likely to 
persuade an appellate court to reverse the conviction.  Students quickly realize 
that someone untrained in the law simply will have no basis for examining 
transcripts and preparing the kind of briefs and oral arguments that can lead to 
reversals. 
Prosecutorial discretion in selecting targets and charges is the next topic.  
Because prosecutorial discretion is largely unreviewable, we spend time 
considering whether grand jurors or magistrates presiding over preliminary 
hearings serve as an effective check when prosecutors abuse their discretion.  
Phil Johnson has selected a wonderful Massachusetts case, Myers v. 
Commonwealth,15 to explore the role of the magistrate.  The defendant asked 
the appellate court to order a new preliminary hearing because the magistrate 
had prevented the defendant from cross-examining the state’s chief witness 
and from adducing evidence in his case in chief because the prosecutor had 
made out a “prima facie” case.16  The case introduces students to the concept 
of sufficiency and asks whether that standard is the appropriate one in 
assessing the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion.  Most students conclude that 
magistrates should be empowered to weigh the credibility of the witnesses if 
the preliminary hearing is to serve as an effective screen.  But then I ask them 
to reconcile this position with the rule that applies at trial—to defeat the 
defense motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and get to the jury, all that a 
prosecutor needs to do is put on a prima facie case. 
We spend some time on why appellate courts have gone to great lengths in 
protecting the plea bargaining process from judicial intervention.  Because the 
vast majority of prosecutions are terminated by plea agreements, we question 
the claim sometimes made that the American model of criminal justice gives 
the accused the most ample pretrial and trial rights.  Should the focus be on the 
processes that lead to plea bargains or on adversarial hearings that usually 
never take place?  Or do the panoply of trial rights influence the plea 
bargaining process? 
 
 14. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 15. 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973). 
 16. Id. at 821-22. 
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We give considerable attention to the prosecution’s burden of proof and 
the right to trial by jury.  In considering the seminal case, Duncan v. 
Louisiana,17 I ask the students to identify one disadvantage that Duncan could 
have avoided if he had been granted a jury trial.  Because Duncan did not 
single out any such disadvantage, I press the students to point out the 
advantages that he could get from jurors at his retrial.  That leads to a 
discussion about the advantages of having jurors rather than a single judge 
decide the question of the defendant’s guilt.  Our discussion is topped by 
Mirjan Damaska’s excellent article on differences between continental and 
common law criminal trials.18  The excerpt focuses on that part of the article in 
which Damaska compares the differences in voting rules and lay and 
professional predispositions to convict.19  Because the students now appreciate 
the importance of selecting jurors who are favorably disposed toward the 
prosecution or the defense, we also explore the exclusion of women and people 
of color from venires, the right to voir dire venires on the race of victims and 
defendants, and the limits on the use of preemptory challenges. 
Our discussion of the prosecution’s burden of proof begins with the 
distinction between the production and persuasion burdens.  Students need to 
know that a chief goal of prosecutors is to get the case to the jury by defeating 
the defense motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.  To do so, prosecutors 
must make out a prima facie case.  Students also need to know that whether 
particular jury instructions on offenses or defenses are given depends on 
satisfying a sufficiency standard.  Because these concepts will not make sense 
in the abstract, my supplement includes a number of trial exercises requiring 
the students to rule on defense motions for directed verdicts as well as on 
defense and prosecution motions for particular jury instructions. 
The trial exercises are based on cases in the casebook and in the 
supplement.  Because the material is difficult for first-year students, the 
exercises capture in witness examination form the principal evidence offered 
by the prosecution and the defense.  I also provide the students with simplified 
definitions of the offenses charged and of lesser offenses available in the 
relevant jurisdiction.  The purpose is not to teach the subtleties of, say, 
common law murder, but to give as much of the definition as is required to 
understand the burden at issue.  Each exercise requires the students to rule on 
motions for directed verdicts or motions for giving particular instructions.  
Students must explain each of their rulings. 
 
 17. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 18. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973). 
 19. Id. at 536-46. 
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A discussion of the prosecution’s burden of proof would not be complete 
without considering the impact of In re Winship20 on jury instructions 
involving presumptions and inferences.  Although this material is particularly 
difficult for students who have not taken Evidence, I have found that the use of 
the trial exercises enables the students to understand these concepts.  Special 
attention is devoted to Mullaney v. Wilbur21 and Patterson v. New York.22  The 
students need to understand why the Court in Patterson retreated from the 
position it took in Mullaney, where it held that a legislature could not 
circumvent Winship simply by reallocating to the defense some elements that 
previously had to be proved by the state.23  Students must understand why 
under our system of government legislatures are given significant latitude in 
defining criminal conduct.  To introduce students to some of the constraints on 
the legislative prerogative, they are assigned the recently decided case, 
Lawrence v. Texas.24 
To give meaning to the right of trial by jury, the relationship between 
confrontation and cross-examination is explored.  The principal case 
considered, Pointer v. Texas,25 leads to a discussion of why the hearsay rule 
exceptions pose a confrontation problem whenever the prosecution fails to 
produce the declarant for examination.  A complete discussion of hearsay and 
its exceptions is unnecessary.  Students can readily grasp the problem by 
attempting to cross-examine the witness who is reporting the hearsay 
declaration.  By this time, students also understand the goals of a cross-
examiner, and can appreciate why none of the goals can be achieved if the 
hearsay declarant is not produced for cross-examination under oath in the 
presence of the jury. 
The final topic in the procedural part of the course is the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Both the defendant’s privilege not to take the stand and a 
witness’s privilege not to answer incriminating questions are explored.  For 
comparison purposes, the students must read another excerpt from Mirjan 
Damaska’s article.  This one focuses on the Western European practice of 
allowing prosecutors to call the accused as a witness (usually as their first 
witness) while permitting the accused to decline to answer any question that 
might incriminate him.26  The question I raise is whether a true adversarial 
proceeding must include the accused’s privilege not to be called as a witness if 
the “right” goal is to force the prosecution to prove its case, if necessary, 
without any testimonial assistance by the defendant. 
 
 20. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 21. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
 22. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 23. Id. at 215-16. 
 24. 539 U.S. 558. 
 25. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
 26. Damaska, supra note 18, at 526-30. 
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It usually takes me about twelve hours to cover the procedural aspects of 
the course.  By the time we complete this part, students are prepared to apply 
their knowledge of trials to the substantive part of the course. 
B. The Substantive Part 
One thing I have learned during my many years of teaching Criminal Law 
is that it is better to cover a few topics well than many poorly.  By the time I 
taught the course for the third time, I no longer attempted to cover most of the 
topics in the book.  In addition to the concepts of vagueness and the principle 
of legality, I now limit the substantive part of the course to one major crime, 
homicide, the basic culpability doctrines, the inchoate offenses, complicity, 
and the role of mental illness.  I discuss self-defense briefly in connection with 
voluntary manslaughter and omit other aspects of justification and excuse.  
While I do cover some aspects of sentencing, I skip the death penalty. 
Phil Johnson provides a number of excellent cases for exploring the 
shortcomings of the common law’s attempts to define with precision the 
criminal mental states.  The first case, Regina v. Faulkner,27 gives students an 
opportunity to see how a number of appellate judges succeeded in creating 
almost total confusion in determining the mental state the prosecution had to 
prove in a case that charged the defendant with “feloniously, unlawfully, and 
maliciously” burning a ship.28  Although I have to help the students distill the 
mental state or states each judge believed the prosecution must prove, any 
comfort the students derive from knowing that we are dealing with an old 
English case is dispelled by the next case.  United States v. Yermian29 is a 1984 
opinion in which the sharply divided Supreme Court disagreed on the mental 
state required to convict someone of “knowingly and willfully” making false 
statements within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.30  Other cases explore 
the materiality of intoxication and mistake in disproving the mental element of 
the crime charged.31  One case tries without much success to fathom what 
Congress had in mind when, in a single statute, it chose to punish some 
violations when made “knowingly” but others only when made “willfully.”32  
Still other cases try to define the appropriate mental state when the legislature 
fails to specify one33 or when the conduct banned does not constitute the kind 
of misconduct typically punished by the criminal law.34 
 
 27. 13 COX CRIM. CASES 550 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1877). 
 28. Id. at 550. 
 29. 468 U.S. 63 (1984). 
 30. Id. at 69. 
 31. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969) (discussing intoxication); Garnett v. 
State, 632 A.2d 797 (Md. 1993) (discussing mistake). 
 32. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). 
 33. See United States v. Garrett, 984 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 34. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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The students’ frustration in attempting to arrive at sensible principles that 
explain the courts’ construction of the statutes is palpable.  I choose that 
moment to introduce them to the revolutionary approach to culpability 
provided by the Model Penal Code (the Code).  To make sure that the students 
spend time trying to understand the Code, I have them prepare written jury 
instructions defining the mental elements of some of the more troublesome 
cases by using the Code’s approach.  They must prepare two copies, one for 
my review and one for their use in class.  I call upon students at random to read 
and defend a particular instruction.  To make sure they understand the 
assignment, the supplement contains detailed instructions on writing the jury 
instructions.  At the end of the exercise, I provide the students with model 
instructions based on the Code.  Because our classrooms were recently 
remodeled to include high-tech gadgetry, I am now able to display my 
instructions on screens that all students can see. 
Forcing the students to use the Code also helps them appreciate some flaws 
that otherwise would not be apparent.  In drafting the instructions involving 
mistake, for example, the students have to contend with the Code’s perplexing 
positions on mistake.  On the one hand, the Code takes the pragmatic approach 
that evidence of mistake should be admissible when it disproves the mental 
state of the offense charged.35  On the other, it bars the use of the evidence if 
the accused would nonetheless be guilty of another offense had the situation 
been as he mistakenly supposed.36  But in such a case, the Code provides that 
the mistake of the accused “shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of 
which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty 
had the situation been as he supposed.”37  Left unanswered is who should 
decide whether the defendant’s claim of mistake should be believed.  If the 
jury decides, then it would appear that the evidence of mistake would have to 
be admitted with instructions directing the jurors to disregard it only if they 
disbelieve the defendant.  The framers of the Code were unable to agree on 
how the provisions on mistake should be implemented. 
In drafting the jury instructions on intoxication, the students encounter 
some of the difficulties they found in applying the general or specific intent 
formulation to determine the admissibility of intoxication under the common 
law.  The leading common law case, People v. Hood,38 teaches them that 
whether the crime charged qualifies as a specific intent offense—thereby 
allowing the accused to disprove the mental element with evidence of his 
voluntary intoxication—presents both definitional and policy questions that 
ultimately must be answered by the appellate courts.  But as a result of recent 
 
 35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1985). 
 36. Id. § 2.04(2). 
 37. Id. 
 38. 462 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1969). 
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amendments to the California Penal Code, when the state prosecutes a 
defendant for murder on the theory that he intentionally killed, the defendant 
may offer his intoxication to disprove that mental state.  However, the 
defendant may not do so when the state proceeds on the theory that the 
defendant acted only recklessly.39  That position turns conventional concepts of 
blameworthiness on their head, an unfortunate result that can also occur under 
the Code.40 
Nonetheless, introducing the Code at this juncture is on balance quite 
beneficial.  Despite the Code’s flaws, the students appreciate its superior 
approach to defining the mental states for the “material” elements of the 
offense charged.  The students learn that the Code is an excellent point of 
departure for assessing the common law approach to homicide (including the 
felony-murder rule), to inchoate offenses (especially attempts and conspiracy), 
and to accomplice liability.  Contrasting the California approach to complicity 
with that of the Code is especially useful.  The students can see how 
California’s approach to liability for collateral offenses committed by 
accomplices to the target offense opens the door to liability almost as wide as 
does the felony-murder rule in cases involving homicides.  Although the 
leading California case on accomplice liability insists on proof that the 
accomplice lend aid or encouragement with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating the commission of the target offense,41 no such limitation is 
imposed for liability for collateral offenses.  Because negligence suffices, 
California juries have been allowed to convict defendants of murder even when 
they were accomplices only to such trivial crimes as the misdemeanor of 
brandishing a weapon.42 
The Code confers an additional pedagogical benefit.  It provides us with a 
common language and framework when discussing the concepts covered under 
the substantive part of the course.  We know the importance of distinguishing 
purpose from knowledge, and knowledge from recklessness, and recklessness 
from negligence.  We know that recklessness is the default mental state where 
the legislature has failed to specify any state.43  And we know that in the 
absence of due process concerns, unless the legislature has specified otherwise, 
neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct 
constitutes an offense is an element of the offense.44  We also know that in 
ruling on objections on irrelevance grounds, as an evidentiary and Code matter, 
 
 39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(b) (West 1999). 
 40. See People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983). 
 41. See People v. Beeman, 674 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1984). 
 42. See People v. Solis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985). 
 44. Id. § 2.02(9). 
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evidence of a higher mental state may always be offered as proof of a lower 
mental state.45 
The latter point merits discussion.  Because the first part of the course 
prepares students to think of criminal law from a trial perspective, we often 
begin our case analysis by constructing the witness examination that gave rise 
to the issue pressed on appeal.  Determining, for example, whether the judge 
should sustain the prosecution’s irrelevance objection to the defendant’s 
testimony regarding his intoxication requires us to examine the jurisdiction’s 
rule on the use of intoxication to disprove mental states.  If the jurisdiction 
follows the prevailing common law rule, then we need to determine whether 
the crime charged has been or can be defined as a specific or general intent 
offense.  If a general intent offense is charged, the objection must be sustained.  
If the jurisdiction follows the Code, we know that the evidence would be 
admissible to disprove purpose or knowledge.  But we also know that if the 
offense charges a crime of recklessness, then the evidence would still be 
admissible, but subject to a limiting instruction telling the jurors to disregard 
the defendant’s evidence if they find that the defendant would have been aware 
of the risk if sober.  Knowing precisely how the rules operate allows us to 
move with greater clarity to a consideration of important normative 
questions.46 
C. First-Year Appellate Advocacy 
Stanford requires all first-year students to take a one-year course on legal 
research and writing.  The second semester is devoted principally to preparing 
briefs in support of an appellate oral argument.  Curriculum B did not change 
this requirement.  However, in the first years that I taught Criminal Law in the 
B Curriculum there was one change.  The Legal Research and Writing course 
had been associated with a small section of about thirty students taking one of 
the required first-year courses.  With the advent of the B Curriculum, the 
second semester was attached to my sixty-student Criminal Law section—
Criminal Law in the B Curriculum was taught in the spring term. 
Because of the students’ familiarity with trials, the writing instructors and I 
decided to embed appellate issues that could be detected through a careful 
examination of the trial record.  Of course, we had to create that record, and 
that meant drafting the witness examinations in which the claimed errors took 
place.  I no longer recall exactly which issues we built into the trial, but my 
experience as a defense lawyer and in preparing materials for the clinical 
course in Advanced Criminal Procedure allowed me to craft the transcript with 
ease.  We selected a case then pending before the California appellate courts 
 
 45. Id. § 2.02(5). 
 46. Using the Code also introduces students to the importance of and difficulties 
encountered in statutory analysis and interpretation. 
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that presented interesting criminal law issues.  Because we did not have access 
to the actual transcript, I constructed the examinations and trial court rulings.  I 
no longer recall whether the transcript included the opening statements, closing 
arguments, and jury instructions.  I hope that it did, because such a transcript 
would have given the students a realistic view of a trial.  I am sure that we 
included some erroneous but trivial rulings to test the students’ ability to 
distinguish between serious and unimportant errors.  After reviewing the 
student’s preliminary assessment, the professors instructed the students on the 
issues to be briefed and argued. 
The writing instructors reported great success with the assignments.  The 
students especially appreciated the close connection between the writing 
course and Criminal Law.  A side benefit was that the actual crime took place 
in one of San Francisco’s major parks, and the writing instructors were able to 
take the students to the crime scene. 
IV.  SOME AFTERTHOUGHTS 
Despite strong approval by the students, the B Curriculum ended in 1987.  
Because I was visiting another school at the time, I was not present at the 
meeting where the faculty chose to end the experiment.  The Lawyering 
Process course survived and was successfully incorporated as a foundation 
course for students enrolled in upper-division courses concentrating on 
representing subordinated populations.  But with the departure of the 
professors who taught in that concentration, the Lawyering Process course, too, 
disappeared from the curriculum in the mid-1990s. 
Only my Criminal Law course survives.  Other criminal law professors 
have not chosen to follow my model.  Experience in trying criminal cases, 
while not indispensable, does help in using a trial approach to teach Criminal 
Law.  I am currently the only criminal law instructor with substantial 
experience trying criminal cases. 
Student response to the course has been mixed.  Some years, the student 
evaluations are almost perfect.  Other years, the students rate the course no 
better than average even though I can perceive no change in the way I teach the 
course.  Each year, some students rate the course as the best they have had.  
Perhaps, these students find that my approach most closely approximates their 
expectations of what they thought they would learn in law school—analyzing 
law from a trial lawyer’s perspective.  But each year, a small group of students 
disapproves of the course.  It does not take many strong negative evaluations to 
bring down a course’s overall ratings.  I cannot tell from the evaluations 
whether these students dislike my approach, my style of teaching, or my 
politics.  Though I inform the students at the outset about my experience as a 
defense lawyer, I might not succeed as much as I would like in keeping my 
biases in check. 
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The course works well for almost all students, so I intend to continue to 
offer the course as an alternative to the traditional Criminal Law course.  I look 
forward to reading the articles in this issue by other professors on the methods 
they employ in teaching Criminal Law.  Teaching is a dynamic enterprise and 
new ways should be considered even when teaching such core courses as 
Criminal Law. 
 
